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a) Introduction 
The formal system of local governance in South Africa has the ‘ward’ as its lowest and 
smallest electoral level – a spatial unit consisting of between 5,000 and 15,000 voters. The 
ward is equivalent to the ‘constituency’ in much of the rest of the world. Notably, the history 
of South Africa means that the vast majority of people live in ‘communities’ or 
neighbourhoods that are far smaller in scale than the ward, and most of these are the site of 
multiple claims of informal leadership by a variety of local organisations and their leaders. 
For example, the Cape Town ward, in which our case- study is located, includes at least five 
different communities, distinguished in racial and class terms. 
Existing ‘below’ and ‘within’ the formal area of the ward, popular practices of 
representation are manifested through a variety of community- based organisations, more or 
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less formalised, regulated and recognised. Some of these community- based organisations are 
neighbourhood- specific, while some of them are federated into broader, national structures 
including the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO). SANCO is a national 
organisation that has relatively independent and heterogeneous branches at the ward level and 
structures at the metropolitan, provincial and national levels. Notably, at the local level 
SANCO is typically structured in terms of committees in every street and sometimes at a 
higher level called the blocks, that meet regularly to deal with issues at the most local of 
levels. This is a tradition of organising that extends back decades in ‘black African’ 
areas,<xen>1</xen> and gives the organisation a tremendous potential reach into 
communities, although not all street committees necessarily see themselves as under 
SANCO’s authority. 
Although not formally recognised in the political system of the country, SANCO is an 
important player in community- level politics because of its significant size and its 
identification with the ANC alliance comprising the ruling party, the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). This 
relationship between SANCO and the ANC (Zuern 2006, Staniland 2008, Piper 2014), 
butand also the ANC’s own strategy of grounding the party in civil society through its 
branches at the ward level (Bénit-Gbaffou 2012), contributes towards the dominance of the 
ruling party over civil society in South Africa, and helps us understand the dynamics around 
leadership at the lowest level. 
In exploring the nature of local leadership, especially in respect of SANCO in our site, 
we want to focus on the notion of mediation, as the concept invokes the idea of some kind of 
‘third-party’ representation of the politically marginalised. Further, in South Africa, like 
many of the southern contexts (Chatterjee 2004, Yiftachel 2009, Piper and Lieres 2011, 
Journal of Asian and African Studies 2011), there is a strong case that the (black) urban poor 
struggle to access the state. Indeed, the need ‘to remedy the inequality [...] […] in access to 
the state’ is, we argue, particularly important in South African low-income neighbourhoods 
for at least three reasons. The first is the fragmentation and complexity of the state apparatus 
and operations, partly linked to its system of three ‘spheres’ (not ‘tiers’) of government 
(national, provincial and local) where overlapping responsibilities are not clearly attributed 
and hierarchised. This fragmentation of the state has been increased after the implementation 
of New Public Management principles in local government in the 2000s that have further 
blurred the roles, functions and responsibilities of multiple parastatal agencies, corporations, 
and organisations in charge of public service delivery and management. 
The second is the dysfunctional and disappointing institutional participatory structures 
and channels set up at the local government level (Transformation 66/67 2008), often leading 
to civil society groups ‘inventing’ other means of getting heard by the state. These include 
mass protests, thatwhich can turn violent (Alexander 2010; Von Holdt et al. 2011), and using 
party connections to replace failing and fragmented local government channels (Bénit-
Gbaffou 2012). Third are the high levels of popular expectation towards a South African state 
that has adopted the figure of the ‘developmental state’ (Van Donk et al. 2008, Parnell and 
Pieterse 2010), and has engaged since 1994 in ambitious state- driven, mass delivery policies 
(housing and basic urban services in particular), especially in the formerly disadvantaged 
areas such as townships and informal settlements. 
This context of ineffectual institutional operation and high popular expectation creates 
conditions conducive to mediatory politics – more specifically a mediatory politics ‘from 
within’ – where effective leaders of the people must assume a representative role that is 
irreducible to the views and interests of either the community or the state, thus establishing 
some kind of ‘third-party’ role, even when of the people. To put the point negatively, local 
leaders who act as simply delegates of the community, or sections thereof, are much less 
likely to secure ongoing access to the state, while those who simply do the state’s bidding, 
run the risk of losing popular support. While remaining effective requires never fully pleasing 
key constituencies, it also means satisfying them enough on key points. 
This general argument is inspired by the recent work done on the challenges of 
legitimation that local leaders face in highly competitive political fields (Bénit-Gbaffou and 
Katsaura 2012). In particular, Bénit-Gbaffou and Katsaura explore the relevance of the 
Bourdieu’s concept of ‘double dealings’ for local leadership – the need to be recognised both 
by its ‘community’ through what we understand as a mix of ‘identity’, ‘service’ and 
‘mediation’, but also centred on the leaders’ ability to solve issues and to ‘deliver’ on 
expectations; and by state and/or party (or private donor/global organisations) through what 
we could summarise here as both a display of loyalty to the institution and an ability to 
inform the institution on community affairs. More specifically, we trace the practices of 
mediation in relation to the ‘double dealing’ required by four sets of challenges that 
especially SANCO leaders must confront: the contested nature of the ‘delivery’ vision, 
‘service delivery’ populism, party loyalty and personal interests. As we shall demonstrate 
below, these general tensions are further exacerbated in our case- study by party- politics, 
underwritten by the identity politics of race (Map 1.1). 
(1) Map 1.1 Imizamo Yethu in Hout Bay 
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b) Imizamo Yethuo, Hout Bay, Cape Town 
First though, we describe the site. Imizamo Yethu (‘our collective effort’) is a 20- year- old 
settlement of black African residents in Hout Bay, Cape Town. It has grown significantly in 
the last ten years, and includes a substantial and diverse foreign migrant population from the 
rest of Africa, especially from Angola, Namibia, Malawi, Zimbabwe and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. Ironically the growth of Imizamo Yethu after 1994 has turned the 
picturesque seaside town of Hout Bay into a familiar apartheid-style settlement with three 
distinct racial groups living in adjacent but racially segregated communities. Thus the so-
called black ‘African’ people live in Imizamo Yethu, ‘coloured’ people in Hangberg and 
‘white’ people in ‘the valley’. Furthermore, these settlements exist in a hierarchy of socio-
economic development reminiscent of apartheid, with the luxury of ‘the valley’ situated 
alongside the poverty of Imizamo Yethu, and Hangberg located somewhere in between. 
Given this, it should not be surprising that much of the politics of Imizamo Yethu, and 
indeed Hout Bay, centres on issues of race and socio-economic development. Indeed, it is 
precisely with the controversial construction of a new school in Imizamo Yethu that our story 
begins. Further, while there are a range of institutions, organisations and individuals that 
represent the community of Imizamo Yethu to the state (or conversely) in some way, whether 
it be local soccer tournament organisers, Christian aid organisations, churches or state-
appointed Ccommunity dDevelopment Wworkers (CDWs), in this chapter we focus on 
SANCO. A key reason for this is the claim by SANCO leaders to be the legitimate 
representatives of the Imizamo Yethu community in general, a claim generally recognised by 
the local ANC, state institutions like the police, and many NGOs working in the area. 
c) The contested vision of ‘service delivery’ 
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In November 2011 the local branch of the South African National Civic Organisation 
(SANCO) organised a protest march against the opening of a new school in Imizamo Yethu, 
the DISA Primary School. The march saw a crowd of around 100 people move through the 
township to the school. Notably, along the way, the protest stopped at the house of the then 
SANCO leader, Mr N, as he was a key supporter of the school. According to the protestors, 
Mr N had not consulted them about the school and they felt that the community needed 
housing rather than another school. Mr N was at work when the protest happened so he did 
not directly confront the protestors. He was also missing when the protestors called a new 
SANCO election for 22 November, at which Mr N and his committee where voted out of 
office. Not surprisingly, the new SANCO executive committee was drawn mostly from the 
leadership ofrom the march against the DISA School. 
Notably, the conflict over the school was not new, but reincarnated a long-standing 
struggle over the space that the school was built on. There is indeed a degree of contest, at 
different scales, about the use of the ‘green belt’ that had been planned by the apartheid 
government when establishing Imizamo Yethu as a site and services scheme in 1991 (Harte et 
al. 2006). Some civic organisations, such as Sinethemba, a splinter group from SANCO 
representing ‘the original’ families having settled in Imizamo Yethu, argued against urban 
growth and densification of the settlement, and wished to see the green belt used for what it 
sees as ‘its original purpose’ – community facilities and a greenbelt, but not housing. 
Sinethemba was supported in this claim by the middle- class and white- dominated Hout Bay 
Ratepayers Association that also wanted to contain the growth of Imizamo Yethu out of fear 
of crime and falling property values. In the view of Harte etl al. (2006), this view also reflects 
white desires for a ‘buffer zone’ between black and white residents of Hout Bay. Against this 
view, SANCO had been lobbying for many years for the use of this land to build more 
houses. TheySANCO also opposed the construction of the school in the name of racial 
integration in Hout Bay, arguing that specific services for Imizamo Yethu would consolidate 
the segregated use of public facilities. TheyIt areis also suspected of lobbying for houses and 
urban growth in order to grow itsheir (mostly ANC) membership basis in a DA- dominated 
ward (Harte et al. 2006). 
In 2004 SANCO appeared to have won this contest when, in the aftermath of a fire 
that left many shack dwellers homeless, the (then ANC-led) municipality started removing 
trees from the ‘green belt’ so as to construct houses. This move was stopped, however, when 
Sinethemba and the Hout Bay Ratepayers Association obtained a High Court interdict against 
the Ccity. While the Ccity subsequently amended the Less Formal Township Establishment 
Act (n 113/1991) to overturn the High Court ruling, only some of the former green belt land 
was used to construct houses with the financial support of a private donor funding from the 
Niall Mellon Foundation. The building of the school in 2010 was led by the municipality, 
after the DA won the city election in 2006, and returned to the idea of community facilities in 
the green belt rather than houses. 
Notably, in 2009, after Mr N became leader of SANCO in Imizamo Yethu, he decided 
to support the municipal view when a private donor put up money for the new school. Thus 
the protest march of 2011 that unseated Mr N from the leadership of SANCO can be 
understood as much in this broader context of party politics as in terms of the inherent merits 
of the needs of the community of Imizamo Yethu. Clearly better education and more housing 
isare needed, as both sides on the debate admit, but they tend to justify their respective 
positions on other grounds. 
The ‘new’ executive committee of SANCO in Imizamo Yethu argues against the 
DISA School on the grounds of nation-building as children ‘ought to go to the same school 
[as white middle class children] as we are one community in Hout Bay’. The nation-building 
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discourse was repeated at a recent public performance where a leader aligned to the new 
SANCO, Mr T, spoke of desiring to overcome the racial divisions of the past and become 
‘Hout Baynians’. Notably, the old SANCO leadership is quiet on the issue of nation-building 
– somewhat ironically as they are accused of being too close to the ‘white’ DA by new 
SANCO leaders who (double irony) ostensiblye want to overcome racial divisions. 
This conflict reflects the challenge leaders face in deciding what form of development 
to endorse, partly due to the inherently tough nature of certain choices like education or 
housing, but also given what is feasible when development is driven by outside forces like the 
state and private donors. Much of the time, the power to set the development agenda simply 
does not lie with local leaders, and the consequent challenge is one of whether, to what extent 
and in what way to endorse the substance of development projects for local communities. 
d) The challenge of service delivery populism 
This dispute over ‘school versus houses’ in Imizamo Yethu displays characteristics noted in 
the recent waves of protest around South Africa, in particular an ongoing contest over the 
framing of ‘service delivery’ issues. An instructive feature of the Imizamo Yethu case is that 
the protest was not about the lack of service delivery, but the delivery of the wrong kind of 
‘service’, a school instead of housing, and the alleged lack of proper public consultation in 
this process. This fact affirms Friedman’s (2009) point that public protest in South Africa is 
about how government engages citizens at the local level, and the tendency of government to 
impose its view on people’s choices. The assertion of rights through protest, especially the 
right to participate in policy-making around development where people live, appears to echo 
Holston’s (2008) conception of ‘insurgent citizenship’, a form of popular agency that looks to 
disrupt the state’s policy world- view and demand a radical, perhaps rights-based, alternative. 
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Thus, on the one hand, the attitude of South African states echoes Chatterjee’s (2004) 
arguments about the dominance of welfarist models of governance in the post-colonial south 
where people are treated as populations to be managed in terms of their welfare, rather than 
as rights-bearing citizens entitled to participate in decisions over their own lives. In this case 
welfare is framed in terms of an obligation to provide services (water, road, sanitation, and 
housing) to ‘the poor’. However, the engagement from ‘the poor’ invokes traditions of 
popular protest against apartheid that are, at least in part, informed by notions of rights 
(Alexander 2010, Van Holdt 2011), and are not simply reducible to instrumental forms of 
patronage politics that Chatterjee notes with his conception of ‘political society’. 
This noted patronage does play a role in local politics in our case, but not in the terms 
of votes for rewards model of Chatterjee’s political society or accounts of politics in Latin 
America (Fox 1994, Gay 1999, Taylor 2004). Rather, patronage is mostly contained within 
party boundaries and underwritten by a race politics that defines access to the local state for 
local leader. Consequently, the most intense forms of competition for office occur now within 
party lines rather than across them and a key challenge for local leaders is to secure their 
positions against rivals from within the same camp. This all occurs outside the realm of 
formal competition through elections in a more informal, insecure and murky political 
universe. It is this reality that has led Van Holdt et al. (2011: 11) to observe the phenomenon 
of ‘protests within protests’, that is, local leaders using protests to assert their legitimacy at 
the same time as ‘subaltern crowds’ protest their marginalisation and demand services. 
Hence, in relation to this last point, while service delivery protest is often about issues 
of citizenship, this does not mean it always has a constructive purpose – and there is evidence 
too that protests are often also a means through which local leaders struggle about positions 
at the community or at the party level. Indeed, the many accounts of protestors destroying 
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state property, albeit sometimes from a well-founded justification of state unresponsiveness 
or mal-responsiveness, suggest a form of violent politics aimed at punishing authority and 
seeking recognition through the threat of violence rather than directing some kind of positive 
change. This form of protest politics we term ‘service delivery populism’, and it constitutes a 
key resource used by leaders in the competition for office. This description of protest we 
reserve for those actions intended to punish the state and perhaps force recognition for new 
actors, rather than construct substantive pro-community political agendas or affirm some kind 
of rights-politics. 
The theoretical as well as practical line between populism and popular contestation is 
slight. There are obviously always elements of deep collective contestation that are at the 
core or ideas of ‘insurgent’ or ‘active’ citizenship, and elements of personal political leaders’ 
agenda in any form of collective mobilisation – that Bourdieu’s’ concept of ‘double dealings’ 
helps us understand outside of any normative framework (see Bénit-Gbaffou and Katsaura 
2012). Thus in Imizamo Yethu the protest against the school had deeper community roots and 
some degree of collective meaning, but the fact that in Imizamo Yethu the protest occurred at 
this time with the school already built, therefore with limited political efficacy other than 
contesting Mr N’s leadership, tends to show its aim was more of an individual, populist 
nature. 
The mobilisation of popular prejudice to disrupt is not the only form of negative 
politics in our case, however. Thus the day we entered Imizamo Yethu to begin our research 
we were confronted with a road blocked by the local taxi association, and saw evidence of 
significant damage to the vehicles of those informal taxi drivers who operated outside of the 
association’s recognition. Upon enquiry it transpired that the formal association had decided 
that there were ‘too many’ taxis in Imizamo Yethu. In defiance the ‘informals’ continued to 
operate, and even in greater number, until the violence broke out. One person was shot in that 
conflict, and many cars damaged, and while tensions endured for some time, both SANCO 
leadership teams reportedly played a role in brokering some kind of peace. 
However, in recent times tensions have re-emerged after an agreement to open the 
formal association to the informal taxi drivers was allegedly shunned by a handful of 
individuals who continue to operate outside of the association and its rules. This practice has 
led one prominent taxi owner to predict another round of violence. He also attributes this to 
the meddling of the ex-SANCO leader Mr N and his people who he alleges are encouraging 
this rebellious activity. ‘Violence will break out again any day now,’ he predicts. If true, it is 
not hard to see how such conflict would undermine the new SANCO and enhance the 
standing of Mr N and company. Thus the ability to prevent rivals from getting things done, 
whether through populist mobilisation or other forms of negative politics, is a key resource in 
the local struggle to lead. 
e) The challenge of party politics 
As already suggested the conflict over DISA School is not simply a case of leadership rivalry 
for office but is underscored by elements of party politics too. Thus in explaining itsheir 
opposition to the school, the new SANCO committee not only alleged that Mr N had 
consistently failed to consult the community on a number of issues but also accused him of 
becoming too comfortable with the DA (read ‘white’)-run city and provincial government 
when he was meant to be representing an ANC (read ‘black’)-aligned community. This 
allegation was pushed to the point where new SANCO executive members raised question 
about where Mr N got the money to build his double-storey house. (Notably, most of the key 
leaderships we encountered in Imizamo Yethu live in the nicer houses in the settlement.) 
In response, Mr N rubbished the claims about a lack of consultation saying there were 
careful negotiations between the community, city and the school’s financial backers over 
many years in the mid-2000s, and that the issue was settled then. He claimed that Mr T, the 
Community Development Worker (CDW) for the ward, was the main instigator behind the 
protest although according to him Mr T was ‘clever’ enough not to actually go on the march, 
and arguing that it was a ‘simple power struggle. It has nothing to do with the school’. 
Notably, new SANCO leaders disagree, repeatedly claiming that there is significant 
dissatisfaction with the choice of the school over housing. 
Mr N and his leadership team argued further that the SANCO election was rigged by 
moving forward the election date when they ‘were away in the field’ so that they would be 
outvoted. They appealed the matter to the SANCO hierarchy, but the provinciale and national 
levels are also split into rival camps, so the ability of the higher structures to resolve the issue 
satisfactorily is hugely diminished. They further accuse Mr T and company of corruption 
with regard to the administration of the housing lists, in particular in the allocation of the 484 
houses donated by the Irish philanthropist Nial Mellon in the mid-2000s. Of course, Mr T 
returns the allegation against Mr N and his team. 
SANCO, and in particular Mr T, wasere indeed the central community partner in the 
project, and Niall Mellon Foundation itself recognises that  
‘the community group that NTT entrusted to lead the housing project had other 
agendas [...]. […]. There were claims that plot-owners who did not share their 
political views were mysteriously left off the housing lists, and plots were illegally 
sold to ‘newcomers’ into the community (who allegedly did share the leaders’ 
political views).’ (Ranjasami et al. 2007). Commented [Q7]: AU: "Ranjasami et al. 2007" has not been 
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 More recently, Mr N attempted to organise a meeting infor about the remaining 50 Niall 
Mellon Foundation houses to be delivered, still claiming to be the legitimate SANCO chair, 
but was stopped by a member of the new SANCO executive who accused him of wanting to 
garner ‘support for himself’. 
Mr T, supporter of the new SANCO executive, points out that as a consequence of his 
opposition to the building of the school, he was personally targeted by the DA-led provincial 
government (as CDWs are employees of the province). Perceived by the Premier’s Office to 
be meddling in the issue for party-political ends he faced formal dismissal, as CDWs are 
forbidden from playing an explicitly partisan role. In the event, he was able to avoid the 
attempted at dismissal, on technical grounds linked to the lack of formal correspondence 
around public participation: this allowed him to question the public participation credential of 
the school project. For Mr T the attentions of the DA provincial government confirmed the 
larger partisan project of governance in the city, and Mr N’s team’s increasing co-option by a 
political party most of the community does not support. 
Thise above narrative draws attention to the relationship between community 
leadership, political parties and race in South Africa, and the challenges this might set for a 
developmental and democratic politics of representation. Two sets of points are to be noted 
here. The first is that in many urban black settlements, the mantle of community leadership is 
claimed by the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO). As argued in more 
detail elsewhere (Piper 2014), SANCO falls under the hegemony of the ANC such that, 
although it aspires to be a mass-based social movement representing the urban poor, it is 
ideologically committed to the same National Democratic Revolution of the ANC and it 
recognises the ANC’s entitlement to rule. The consequence of this identification is that, while 
Commented [Q8]: AU: It is not clear from the next paragraphs 
what the second point is. Please clarify. 
SANCO has relative access to the ‘party-state’ where the ANC governs, it has so on 
compromised terms that limit the scope for challenge. 
This is true even when community- based organisations other than SANCO dominate 
community politics as the ability to reach the state and get access to its resources goes mostly 
through ANC rather than local government channels and networks (Bénit-Gbaffou 2012). 
The formal alliance and/or informal sympathy of community-based organisations to the ANC 
also allow them to claim a special right to represent the community. It might be the case that 
the more formal link to the ANC, the stronger the claim. Thus widely commented upon by 
respondents, not least the foreign residents of Imizamo Yethu who brought a refreshing 
outsider’s perspective to these local dynamics, was the claim that SANCO was the ‘little 
brother’ of the ANC, and a key way for South Africans (only) to begin a career in politics. 
Critically however, Imizamo Yethu is in the City of Cape Town that has been ruled by 
the DA since 2006. In this context, the association with the ANC is a disadvantage for 
accessing the state, as SANCO is perceived as ANC aligned, and the DA insists on non-
partisan form of community representation when engaging with communities around 
development projects. This model is echoed in the Violence Prevention through Urban 
Upgrading Projects model of community engagement too for instance (Piper 2014). 
However, despite the insistence on non-partisan community representation in state-sanctioned 
projects, the DA is quick to claim credit for the state that delivers such projects at election 
time. Non-partisanship applies only at the moment of community engagement it appears. 
Notably, one of the reasons that SANCO is treated as a junior partner of the ANC is 
because of its dependence on the party-state for resources to function. Barely a few months 
after their electoral triumph, one of the new SANCO leaders confessed concern that ‘nothing 
was happening’ in Imizamo Yethu, in the sense that there were no new development projects 
underway, and specifically no project-related jobs for SANCO to be seen to be delivering. A 
recent interview confirmed this implosion with ANC failing to secure more than 200 paid- up 
members, and SANCO in an even worse condition. ‘The guys just do not want to admit that 
they have failed...…’ A key issue here may be the unwillingness of the new SANCO to be 
more pragmatic in engaging the local state for fear of being seen precisely as the sell-outs 
they accused Mr N of becoming. 
Conversely, one of the striking features of our case is the way the old SANCO 
leadership, and Mr N in particular, has embraced the DA state’s discursive framing of 
‘community representation’. This includes absorbing some of the key language such as 
‘representing the whole community regardless of political party’ (a commitment that the new 
SANCO executive made too), only being concerned about ‘local development and not party 
politics’, and being ‘pragmatic’ in engaging with ‘all opportunities to advance the interests of 
Imizamo Yethu’ from the ward forum, to the Hout Bay Development Forum, to the 
introduction of the DISA school. The language and behaviour of Mr N raises the question 
whether, in order to access the state, he has replaced the partisan loyalty discourse required of 
the party-state with the ‘non-partisan’ loyalty discourse required by DA rule. 
One clear implication of Mr N’s attempt to access the state in new ways has been to 
make him vulnerable to allegations of being a sell-out, and to paint his preference for the 
school as a representation of ‘white’/DA interests over ‘black’/ANC community interests in 
more housing. While the reality is more complicated, the party politicisation of the role of the 
developmental state, and the challenges this poses for representing poor black communities, 
is demonstrated profoundly. On the other hand, the broadening of such discourses of non-
partisanship and of such pragmatic attitudes of working with the state, whatever party is in 
power (in a context where the DA seems to be gaining power at the municipal and provincial 
levels), might indicate a shift away from identity politics and an emerging representation of 
the state that is disentangled from partisan clientelist logics. 
This latter claim concurs with a number of other, minor but multiple, observations in 
other contexts. See, in Johannesburg, Matlala and Bénit-Gbaffou (2012) on social movement 
activists negotiating their ANC loyalty, Sinwell (2014) on a social movement leader joining 
the DA branch to put pressure on the ANC councillor, and Bénit-Gbaffou (2012) on a leader 
working with a DA councillor in spite of her ANC membership; and on the temptation of a 
civic leader to sympathise with the IFP to put pressure on the local government. The key 
point is that the change of party in Cape Town has brought with it a different attitude from 
the state towards political representation of poor and marginaliszed communities, and some 
local leadership has begun to respond and engage in these new political terms. At the moment 
in Imizamo Yethu it seems like the old ANC ways are holding firm, but given their lack of 
success and the popular desire for state-driven service delivery, a more pragmatic shift in 
attitude to ‘non-partisan’ forms of popular representation is now a real possibility. 
f) The challenge of state dependency 
This point brings us to the significance of dependency on the state for development, and the 
implications for mediatory leadership at a personal level. Thus even in a context where 
political parties were entirely absent, community leadership would confront the problem of 
what Bénit-Gbaffou and Katsaura (2012), based on Bourdieu, term ‘double dealings’. 
‘Double- dealing’ commonly means ‘duplicity, deceit or treachery’, and is associated with 
pretending one set of feelings while acting in a contrary way. It is also commonly associated 
with politicians, and seen as some form of moral failing. However, Bénit-Gbaffou and 
Katsaura use the concept of double- dealing in a different way that frames it not as a moral 
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problem but as a problem of negotiating opposing rationalities. In brief ‘double dealing’ 
refers to the tensions faced by local leaders between representing their constituencies and 
being recognised by state institutions and agents – and working to keep and extend the latter. 
This often puts leaders in contradictory positions, and, in South Africa, generally leads him/ 
or her to ‘betray’ the former for the latter – the community for, in this case, the state; become 
‘co-opted’, ‘sedated’, or ‘sold out’ to the state that his/her community mandate sometimes 
requires him/her to engage in and often to challenge. 
In this regard it is clear from our engagement that the older politicians across the 
political divide (specifically Mr N and Mr T) displayed a much greater degree of knowledge 
of the state system and pragmatism in engaging with the authority than the younger 
politicians who tended to be much more dogmatic and ideological in their articulation. This is 
probably not surprising, but it does affirm the significance of understanding the formal 
system, how to access it and even how to secure various opportunities and resources from it 
for those who want to build a legitimacy as effective as well asthe popular leaders’ 
legitimacy, especially if they reinforce the framing of leadership as around ‘delivery’ – the 
channelling the public resources into the neighbourhood, on a collective or individual basis. 
Whilest one sees alternative forms of constructing local legitimacy (more radical 
social movements seek to build legitimacy outside any expectations from the state, or at least 
in much more autonomous ways), the dominant form of legitimation that a local leader 
invokes before his/her constituency is usually around the ability to channel and redistribute 
resources to the community, according to some kind of local ‘moral economy’ (Staniland 
2008, Berman & and Lonsdale 1992). This raises the issue of the co-option by the state in the 
process of representing the community – and of the thin line that exists between a politics of 
mediation – representing and advocating for the community’s claims in the state – and the 
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politics of double dealing, where the risk is always high of the leader ‘betraying’ his/her 
constituency in order to secure and reproduce his/her network and privileged access to the 
state. 
The challenges of leadership are aggravated by party politics and service delivery 
populism, but more generally for local leaders in cities of the Ssouth, by the multiplicity of 
would-be leaders competing for positions (and the economic opportunities these might 
provide) in contexts marked by informal livelihoods and fluid opportunities (Simone 2004), 
and by the informal nature of their representativeness that makes it easy to be challenged by 
rivals, and constantly questioned in a variety of local political arenas. Examples include the 
use of service delivery populism, sponsoring conflict in the local taxi association, securing 
recognition as leaders in the eyes of the state such has the ward forum, and through 
representation on state-sponsored development projects such as the DISA School. 
Indeed the extra-institutional nature of community leadership means that their 
standing is always informal, especially outside of communities that are led by SANCO, as at 
least SANCO’s community leadership status is underwritten by ANC ideology. This 
informality is clearly a weakness in securing office, but a strength in accessing it. Thus, 
although Mr N was not elected as the new SANCO leader, he is far from a spent force in the 
community, and is able to contest the legitimacy of the new SANCO both by claiming 
irregularities in the election process – ‘they brought the election forward without informing 
us’ – but alsoand by his enduring connections to the state and key networks around the state 
that give him privileged ability to get things done. 
One of the reasons that this conflict has been able to endure for over a year is that the 
local divisions that typify SANCO in Imizamo Yethu are repeated at metropolitan, provincial 
and national levels. Indeed both sides invoked the authority of the provincial structures of 
SANCO to support their claim to legitimacy, but it turned out that these were different 
factions at provincial level. Notably, the one structure that is not contested is the SANCO 
region (at the metropolitan level), but here Mr T is a leading figure and so his authority over 
the local dispute is called into question. The irresolution of the SANCO conflict is widely 
recognised by other local players including the local police, the ANC, the DA Wward 
Ccouncillor and the school leadership. Most have adopted a wait- and- see attitude, and are 
reluctant to engage SANCO while the dispute continues – in a sense affirming the perception 
that SANCO leaders are accepted as the legitimate community leaders. This unsupportive 
attitude from the DA Wward Ccouncillor was a source of much frustration to Mr N and 
company, the current Imizamo Yethu representatives on the Wward Fforum, as they felt it 
betrayed a weakness on her behalf. Despite many years of courting relationships with the DA 
state, at some political risk to himself, Mr N has not found the political protection he feels he 
deserves. 
g) Conclusions 
This in-depth reflection on the challenges facing SANCO leaders in Imizamo Yethu sheds 
some light generally on the informal politics of representation in poor, urban neighbourhoods 
of the Gglobal Ssouth. In particular we draw attention to the likelihood that local leaders are 
likely to confront a range of different challenges that require some form of ‘double- dealing’, 
including at a personal level. Further, in South Africa’s case, the framing of community 
leadership around issues of ‘service delivery’ by SANCO creates a series of specific 
challenges in relation to the lack of power of local leaders in deciding the substance of 
development, and their vulnerability to the politics of service delivery populism, not least 
given the informal and contested nature of SANCO’s political and legal standing. Lastly, in 
Cape Town more specifically, SANCO must confront the additional challenge of a state that 
is controlled by the DA, a party in opposition to its ally, the ANC. Cashing out its leadership 
credentials in terms of service delivery and ANC loyalty thus places Imizamo Yethu’s 
leaders on the horns of a legitimacy-–efficacy dilemma. The result, at the moment, is 
paralysis. 
In light of the above, we argue that effective leadership by SANCO in Imizamo Yethu 
would require a particular kind of mediation that can master the challenges of ‘double- 
dealing’, that is becoming an honest broker, by identifying and resolving the hard questions 
of the development vision largely determined at higher political levels; seeing off populist 
and disruptive rivals; managing the different ‘sedation’ pressures from competing parties; and 
resisting co-option by the state and the temptation to betray (contested and heterogeneous) 
community claims. This is not a politics of popular delegate or elitist trustee, but of the 
sophisticated balance of enough but not too much – a ‘just-right’ Goldilocks politics that is 
nothing short of Herculean. Notably the high risk of failure for the mediator translates into a 
failure of effective and legitimate representation for poor communities in urban South Africa. 
In this case then, it is thus not hard to see the link between mediation and the limitations of 
representation for the poor that typifies the Gglobal Ssouth. 
While the challenge of the substantive vision of development is rarely something that, 
of itself, threatens the legitimacy of leadership, the problem is how to go about the process of 
popular authorisation of an externally- imposed development vision by the state or donors, 
especially given the threat of service delivery populism. Indeed, the challenge of populism is 
particularly acute in the context of informal leadership, with no formal, legal or electoral 
mandate that opens the way for constant challenge to leaders’ legitimacy. This may reach the 
point of blocking the developmental process by crystallising leaders’ energies around 
destructive political battles. 
For SANCO leadership, the constant competition for office also increases the 
necessity to demonstrate their ability to deliver and redistribute to the community, and, in 
particular, in contexts of developmental states with mass public resources being directed 
towards low- income neighbourhoods, their ability to capture and channel public resources. It 
further sets up the terrain for leadership battles around projects and development. The 
challenge here is to find the right balance between addressing genuine or deep internal 
community divisions that need to be dealt with democratically, and discarding populist and 
destructive mobilisation that often serves rival’s personal interests (these two dimensions are 
always both present, but with different balances). 
The third challenge is the navigation of party politics. It might be particularly the case 
in a dominant party system, where state-–party boundaries are blurred and political behaviour 
is dominated by identity politics. Most studies of the politics of cities of the south highlight 
the volatility of party allegiances, out of the need for pragmatism and seizing opportunities, at 
the same time as stressing the importance of identity politics in popular neighbourhoods. In 
the South African context, almost two decades after the liberation, an analysis in terms of 
identity politics is still relevant, but there are signs that pragmatic approaches are developing 
beyond political partisanship, and ANC- aligned leaders engage with the state even if not 
dominated by their political party, adopting a discourse of non-partisanship and working with 
the state to improve the lives of their communities. In some cases, leaders have even been 
able to play on political rivalries to put pressure on the state or the dominant party for a more 
democratic process of delivery. This raises the possibility that the South African condition is 
normalising, although more work is required on the intersection between identity politics and 
manoeuvring of party competition for increased community power. 
Fourthly, and maybe more generally, mediation always runs the risk of co-option of 
leaders, in a myriad of complex state structures and processes, including many state-
sanctioned projects by public-–private and private players that open opportunities for leaders 
to put themselves ahead of representing the marginalised. The informal nature of leadership 
requires personal rather than institutional networks to be established and maintained – 
shaping the nature of leaders’ politics of mediation in a clientelistic way that reinforces the 
importance of loyalty to the ‘hand that feeds’, rather than critical engagement with the state 
for the benefit of the leaders’ constituency. This risk is at the core of the politics of 
mediation, but cannot be avoided in the attempts to construct democratic engagements 
between civil society and the state. More remains to be researched on the conditions that 
would minimise this risk for civil society organisations, between a politics of formalisation of 
engagements diminishing the need for clientelistic networks capturing leaders in 
contradictory loyalties; and a politics of autonomy where alternative views of development 
find a space to emerge and to consolidate. 
<en-group type=“endnotes”> 
<en><label>1</label> In this chapter we follow the popular convention of describing the 
residents of Imizamo Yethu in racial terms as ‘black’, although official government 
practice is to follow the apartheid- era categorisation of ‘black African’, ‘coloured’, 
‘Indian’, ‘white’ and other. For example see Census 2011 
(http://www.statssa.gov.za/Publications/P03014/P030142011.pdf). This is in contrast 
to the anti-apartheid movement’s categorisation of ‘African’, ‘coloured’ and ‘Indian’ as 
‘black’. 
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